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International economic agreements increasingly touch on 
fundamental principles of corporate governance.  The trend 
contrasts with existing scholarship, which assumes corporate 
law evolves via domestic mechanisms.  This Article introduces 
the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, with its 
dedicated chapter on corporate governance, as a case study.  At 
the normative level, the emergence of corporate governance in 
international agreements represents a positive development by 
enabling countries to signal and put into action commitments for 
better governance.  Given these recent developments, the field 
of comparative corporate governance should incorporate 
international agreements as an emerging source of law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In February 2019, a new Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA) came into force between the European Union and Japan.2  
The parties have touted a remarkable innovation in the text: for 
the first time, an EU trade agreement includes an entire chapter 
dedicated to corporate governance.3  Thus far, no academic 
article has analyzed this agreement nor its relation to past 
corporate governance initiatives.  This gap is striking, given the 
expected scale and influence of the agreement.  The two 
signatories cover a combined economic area equal to a third of 
global GDP and over 600 million people.4 
 
The addition of a corporate governance chapter in the EPA 
is seemingly groundbreaking.  However, it actually follows a 
broader pattern of international economic agreements 
impacting domestic corporate law and governance. 
 
This Article seeks to expand the existing literature on 
international law and corporate governance by analyzing 
provisions in the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement 
and previous economic agreements.  Through explicit and 
implicit provisions, international economic agreements have a 
major but unappreciated influence on intra-firm dynamics 
between shareholders, managers, directors, and other 
stakeholders.  These agreements can encourage convergence 
over a shared set of corporate governance principles. 
 
The increased focus on corporate governance in 
international agreements represents a positive development by 
enabling countries to signal and put into action a commitment 
to better governance.  Looking ahead, the European Union, and 
even the United States, may push similar corporate governance 
                                                          
2  European Commission Press Release IP/19/785, EU-Japan Trade 
Agreement Enters Into Force (Jan. 31, 2019). 
3  European Commission MEMO/18/6784, Key Elements of the EU-Japan 
Economic Partnership Agreement (Dec. 12, 2018). 
4  Foo Yun Chee, EU-Japan Free Trade Deal Cleared for Early 2019 Start, 
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initiatives in future economic agreements.  Such initiatives 
could strengthen domestic reformers in countries looking to 
implement more accountable corporate governance regimes. 
 
Part I will provide the current landscape for debates in 
comparative corporate governance.  Part II introduces the new 
EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, with its dedicated 
chapter on corporate governance.  Part III will seek to identify 
theoretical explanations for the appearance of corporate 
governance provisions in international agreements.  Part IV 
places the EPA within the broader history of international 
agreements that explicitly and implicitly impact intrafirm 
governance. 
I. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE 
The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), with its 
dedicated corporate governance chapter, emerges amidst 
ongoing discussion about the role of corporate governance in 
economic growth.  Research has demonstrated that 
improvements in corporate governance, such as investor 
protection, can have a positive impact on firm performance.5  
Such improvements can scale across an economy.  More broadly, 
a debate rages on whether corporate law can promote capital 
markets, which are seen as an important tool for development.6  
The literature has broadly assumed that corporate governance 
is a matter of firm choice under the constraint of a given 
country’s laws. 
 
The discipline of corporate governance delves into the web 
of relationships, rights, and responsibilities of different actors 
involved in a corporation.  The Organization for Economic 
                                                          
5  See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance and 
Firm Performance, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 257, 257 (2008) (finding positive 
correlations between difference governance measures and firm operating 
performance). 
6  See Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 
46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 285 (2008) (describing the differing economic 
consequences of the common and civil law systems); c.f., Mark J. Roe, Legal 
Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460, 527 (2006) 
(legal origins data is not a strong indicator for predicting financial outcomes of 
countries in the twentieth century). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/2
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Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines corporate 
governance as “a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders, and other 
stakeholders.”7  Corporate governance also includes “the 
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, 
and the means of attaining those objectives . . . .”8  Corporate 
law regulates these interactions, focusing on reducing conflicts 
inherent between major actors in the corporation: managers and 
shareholders, controlling and non-controlling shareholders, and 
shareholders and other contractual parties (such as employees 
and creditors).9  Private sources of regulation also exist.  Stock 
exchanges, for instance, set requirements for listed firms.  “Soft 
law,” involving voluntary corporate commitments, plays an 
influential gap-filling role.10  A prominent example includes the 
Cadbury Code in the United Kingdom, which was developed by 
the Financial Reporting Council, the Stock Exchange and the 
accountancy profession.11 
A. The Convergence Debate 
Globalization has raised the stature of corporate 
governance, as companies subject to one set of national rules 
trade, operate, and compete with counterparts operating under 
other sets of rules.  Such interactions have raised questions of 
whether current economic and political trends will result in one 
set of principles, or whether domestic differences and the rise of 
new players, such as China, will result in divergent trajectories. 
 
                                                          
7  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, G20/OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance 1, 11 (2015), 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf 
(hereinafter OECD Principles); see infra Section I.D (discussing further the 
OECD’s approach to corporate governance). 
8  OECD Principles, supra note 7. 
9  John Armour et al., The Essential Elements of Corporate Law: What is 
Corporate Law?, in ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 2, 3 (Gerard Hertig et al. eds., 
2017). 
10  See Douglas M. Branson, Teaching Comparative Corporate 
Governance: The Significance of “Soft Law” and International Institutions, 34 
GA. L. REV. 669, 670 (2000) (arguing that “soft law” has overtaken law itself as 
the “principal determinant of corporate behavior”). 
11  Mohammed B. Hemraj, Preventing Corporate Failure: The Cadbury 
Committee’s Corporate Governance Report, 10 J. FIN. CRIME 141, 142 (2002). 
5
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On the side of convergence, Henry Hansmann and Reinier 
Kraakman argue in The End of History for Corporate Law that 
the remaining differences in national systems are relatively 
minor.12  Corporations around the world benefit, by law, from a 
similar set of features, including a recognized legal personality, 
limited liability, and transferable share ownership.  An 
emerging consensus of jurisdictions gives shareholders control 
of the corporation, obligates managers to focus on shareholder 
interests, and segregates other stakeholders to the realm of 
regulatory or contract enforcement.13  Such changes have 
emerged from three dynamics of the global economy: “the failure 
of alternative models, the competitive pressures of global 
commerce, and the shift of interest group influence in favor of an 
emerging shareholder class.”14  These justifications connect to 
the centrality of globalization in the convergence hypothesis.  In 
a competitive environment, effective corporate governance can 
serve as an advantage for individual companies and nations.  
Better practices can result in increased investor confidence, and 
in turn, a lower cost of capital.  Companies and individuals are 
thus incentivized towards a natural uptake of efficient norms.15  
Alternatively, investors and acquirers operating in global capital 
markets seek to standardize corporate governance practices to 
facilitate the flow of capital.16 
 
Other scholars have opposed the convergence hypothesis, 
highlighting the persistence of nation-specific corporate 
governance practices.17  Lucian Bebchuk and Mark Roe have 
                                                          
12  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for 
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001). 
13  Id. at 440. 
14  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Reflections on the End of 
History for Corporate Law, in THE CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
32 (Abdul A. Rasheed & Toru Yoshikawa eds., 2012). 
15  See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe, CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE 
IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1, 2 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark Roe eds., 2004) 
(discussing the diffusion of corporate governance norms through investors, 
international organizations, and other actors).   
16  Id.; see infra Section III.D (discussing standardization in corporate 
governance practice, reducing the costs for investors to understand and operate 
under different regimes). 
17  See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path 
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 
(1999) (identifying initial legal structures as an impediment to global 
convergence). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/2
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proposed a path dependence theory: the initial ownership 
structures of a society, and the precedent of corporate law and 
practice, insulate domestic corporate structures from global 
pressures to conform.18 
 
The emergence of international regimes for corporate 
governance appear, at first glance, to support the convergence 
hypothesis.  Particularly where provisions require specific 
binding actions, such agreements push domestic law towards 
similar outcomes.  However, as discussed below, international 
agreements may also leave room for, or explicitly permit, 
significant amounts of domestic variation. 
B. Comparative Corporate Governance and International 
Regimes 
Analyses of comparative corporate governance have largely 
neglected the role of state-to-state or multilateral agreements in 
influencing corporate governance practice.  The preceding 
convergence debate highlights the role of decentralized 
participants in the evolution of corporate governance: (i) local 
actors, including the political and business sectors; and (ii) 
foreign actors, typified by investors and acquirers.19  The model 
focuses on a domestic view of corporate governance diffusion, 
where each nation, and actors within each nation, engage in a 
decentralized process of reform or resistance. 
 
Newer scholarship has begun exploring the role of global 
governance on corporate law practice.  For instance, Jeffrey 
Gordon has critiqued an approach that ignores international 
regimes, noting that: 
To an extent that might surprise academics focused on the political 
economy of races to the top or bottom driven by local political 
economy, convergence on a common set of corporate governance 
                                                          
18  Id. at 129.  
19  Jeffrey Gordon, Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Law and 
Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 
28, 28 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2017). 
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principles and practices has been driven by various forms of global 
governance.20 
One thread of scholarship has embraced international 
regimes for corporate governance.  Jeffrey Gordon and Curtis 
Milhaupt have proposed a multilateral regime to regulate 
outbound M&A activity for firms under potential government 
influence.21  The proposal aims to ensure that “the prospective 
buyer is motivated by private economic gain-seeking,” and not 
by nationalist/mercantilist goals.22  Their work emerges from the 
rise of Chinese-style entities that threaten the model of a profit-
driven corporate entity.23 
 
Mariana Pargendler has raised doubt on the viability of 
international corporate governance regimes by highlighting 
protectionism in corporate law.24  Nationalism has shaped 
corporate law into a tool to prevent competition, impeding 
convergence towards a shareholder-friendly governance model.25  
Resurgent nationalist impulses may weaken the prospects for 
corporate governance in international agreements. 
 
Other works have narrowly assessed the role of specific 
provisions of international economic agreements, often focusing 
on the role of international arbitration provisions in intra-firm 
governance.26  Arbitration agreements may violate principles of 
corporate governance by privileging one group of equity holders 
(foreign shareholders) with remedies unavailable to another 
                                                          
20  Jeffrey Gordon, Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Law and 
Governance 28, 50 (Columbia Law & Econs., Working Paper No. 574, 2017).  
21  See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon & Curtis J. Milhaupt, China as a 
‘National Strategic Buyer’: Towards a Multilateral Regime for Cross-Border 
M&A 192 (Columbia Law & Econs., Working Paper No. 585, 2018). 
22  Id. at 196. 
23  Id. at 225. 
24  Mariana Pargendler, The Grip of Nationalism on Corporate Law 1, 3 
(European Corp. Governance Inst. Law, Working Paper No. 437, 2019). 
25  Id. at 4. 
26  See, e.g., Vera Korzun, Shareholder Claims for Reflective Loss: How 
International Investment Law Changes Corporate Law and Governance, 40 U. 
PENN. J. INT’L L. 189, 189 (2018) (highlighting the issues associated with 
permitting shareholders to bring indirect reflective loss claims through 
arbitration, while traditional corporate law frowns on such suits without 
director approval or coordination with the corporation).  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/2
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group of equally situated equity holders (domestic 
shareholders). 
C. Harmonization and Unification 
Global corporate governance could involve harmonization, 
or in the more extreme case, unification.  Harmonization aligns 
domestic laws to address an externality or need for collective 
action (for example, to stem a race to the bottom in terms of tax 
treatment).  Unification takes the concept further, resulting in 
parties that are bound by the same authority and the same law. 
 
In the corporate governance space, the European Union 
(EU) provides a conspicuous example of international 
coordination in corporate law.  Brussels has included corporate 
governance as part of a broader integrationist agenda because 
domestic corporate law can impinge on the free movement of 
capital and support protectionist tendencies.27  In response, the 
EU created the Societas Europaea, which facilitates cross-border 
transfers and mergers.28  Other EU initiatives have focused on 
harmonization of national laws.  Directives have forced member 
states to facilitate shareholder voting and activism,29 and force 
disclosure of large voting blocks.30  However, the EU has also 
failed quite significantly in imposing uniform rules, most 
obviously in the optional implementation of 2004 Takeover 
Directive.31  This Article will instead focus on relatively 
understudied international efforts beyond internal EU policies.  
For instance, the OECD has provided a particularly useful set of 
                                                          
27  Martin Gelter, EU Company Law Harmonization Between Convergence 
and Varieties of Capitalism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF 
CORPORATE AND COMPANY LAW 323–25, (Harwell Wells ed. 2018); see also Luca 
Enriques, A Harmonized European Company Law: Are We There Already?, 66 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 323, 333–34 (2017) (discussing company law harmonization 
within the European Union). 
28  Council Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001, of 8 Oct. 2001, art. 24. 
29  Caspar Rose, The New European Shareholder Rights Directive: 
Removing Barriers and Creating Opportunities for More Shareholder Activism 
and Democracy, 16 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 269, 269 (2012). 
30  Marco Becht & Ailsa Röell, Blockholdings in Europe: An International 
Comparison, 43 EURO. ECON. REV. 1049, 1050 (1999). 
31  Ben Clift, The Second Time as Farce? The EU Takeover Directive, the 
Clash of Capitalisms and the Hamstrung Harmonization of European (and 
French) Corporate Governance, 47 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 55, 55 (2009). 
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guidelines that have set the agenda for corporate governance 
reforms in both developed and emerging markets.32 
D. Global Standards: The Role of the G20/OECD Principles on 
Corporate Governance 
Since the late 1990’s, the non-binding OECD Principles 
have emerged as a prominent building block for the diffusion of 
corporate governance practices.  Today, many of the 
international agreements on corporate governance explicitly 
adhere to these Principles. Such alignment between 
international agreements and the OECD Principles has the 
potential to speed up convergence in rules and practices.33 
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and 
other international organizations participated in the formation 
of the OECD Principles and use the output to assess individual 
country performance.34  Using one comprehensive document 
enables these international organizations and other observers to 
evaluate disparate corporate governance regimes on a similar 
basis.  Among OECD members, Japan’s recent corporate 
                                                          
32  OECD Principles, supra note 7. 
33  Id. at 5 (The OECD Principles focus on six components: (i) “ensuring 
the basis for an effective corporate governance framework,” focused on 
transparency and fairness, the rule of law, and supervision and enforcement; 
(ii) “the rights and equitable treatment of shareholders and key ownership 
functions,” setting out the requirements for effective shareholder participation, 
protection of minority shareholders, related-party transactions, and fair 
processes for transfer of control; (iii) “institutional investors, stock markets, 
and other intermediaries,” to align incentives for capital markets to support 
sound economic growth; (iv) “the role of stakeholders in corporate governance,” 
establishing that stakeholder rights based on law, contract, or other 
agreements must be respected; (v) “disclosure and transparency,” focused on 
“all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial 
situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company;” and (vi) 
“the responsibility of the board,” establishing the board’s obligation to monitor 
management and the board’s own accountability to the company and its 
shareholders). 
34  E.g., Corporate Governance, WORLD BANK, (Feb. 24, 2016), 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/brief/corporate-governance 
(discussing the work of the World Bank’s Corporate Governance group, which 
engages with the OECD to set standards); Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 
https://www.imf.org/external/NP/rosc/rosc.aspx (last updated: June 21, 2019) 
(using the OECD guidelines to evaluate country performance on corporate 
governance). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/2
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governance discussions are typical—policymakers have 
explicitly cited the Principles in formulating and messaging 
changes.35  Non-OECD members also look to the Principles—
recently, Colombia drafted corporate law reforms as part of its 
OECD accession efforts.36  Even when formal legal changes do 
not immediately take place, the Principles operate as “soft law” 
by influencing corporate practices.37  The OECD Principles have 
emerged as the fundamentally voluntary starting position for 
many global efforts to reform corporate governance. 
II. CASE STUDY: THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHAPTER IN THE 
EU-JAPAN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 
The 2018 EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA) includes a unique provision—an entire chapter dedicated 
to corporate governance.38  The EPA aims to facilitate trade and 
investment between EU member states and Japan, where 
existing economic ties had stagnated or even declined.  The 
agreement primarily tackles tariffs and regulatory frameworks.  
By including corporate governance among these topics, the EPA 
responded to a convergence of private and public sector concerns 
                                                          
35  Masato Kanda, Corporate Governance for Growth: Japan’s Initiative 
Along with OECD (Oct. 29 2015), 
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/conference/danwa/20151029.pdf (“It is a great 
honor for me to have this opportunity to introduce Japan’s recent initiatives of 
corporate governance reforms which are in line with the new OECD Principals 
and the mutual relationship between them.”). 
36  OECD, Corporate Governance in Colombia (2017), 
http://www.ciando.com/img/books/extract/9264281134_lp.pdf (discussing 
reforms Colombia made in preparation of OECD accession). 
37  Ruth V. Aguilera & Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Codes of Good Governance 
Worldwide: What is the Trigger?, 25 ORG. STUD. 415, 417 (2004) (discussing the 
use of voluntary corporate governance principles to overcome legal obstacles 
and change business practices); LaPorta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. 
ECON. 113, 113 (1998) (discussing the significant critiques of the Principles 
have focused on insufficient attention to the relative strength of controlling 
and minority shareholders. Pre-2015 versions of the Principles focused on 
resolving conflicts between management and shareholders and did not address 
abusive actions by controlling shareholders. Today, the Principles suggest low 
share ownership thresholds for proposing agenda items, supermajority 
requirements for important decisions, redress against abusive actions, and 
directors independent of dominant shareholders); see also Victor Zitian Chen 
et al., Are OECD-prescribed “Good Corporate Governance Practices” Really 
Good in an Emerging Economy?, 28 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 115, 115 (2011) 
(assessing the application of an earlier version of the G20/OECD Principles). 
38  European Commission MEMO/18/6784, supra note 3. 
11
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about Japan’s corporate governance practices.39 
 
The inclusion of a new subject matter within a trade 
agreement raises questions about the motivations of the parties, 
and the rationale for its inclusion in a broader trade and 
investment agreement.  This agreement provides Japan with a 
strong signaling device to highlight recent efforts to improve 
corporate governance.  The agreement’s flexible language 
correctly avoids the risks of overly-constraining language, as the 
agreement must be reconciled with the varieties of capitalism 
present in EU member states and Japan. 
A. The Stated Rationale: Corporate Governance for Economic 
Integration 
Publications from the European Union frame the 
investment and anti-protectionist justifications for a chapter for 
corporate governance.  A European Commission report focused 
on the expected investment benefits: “the corporate governance 
chapter has the potential to impact FDI not only in quantitative 
terms, by increasing the attractiveness of the investment 
environment in both Parties, but also in qualitative terms, by 
encouraging responsible and sustainable investment.”40  The 
improvement in the investment environment impacts both 
cross-border financial flows (which are largely within scope of 
the EPA), but also domestic investment (by encouraging more 
“responsible and sustainable” practices).  The report focuses on 
corporate governance “as an essential tool to attract and 
encourage investment by promoting well-functioning markets 
and sound financial systems based on transparency, efficiency, 
trust and integrity.”41 
 
A second report by the European Parliament embraced a 
more comprehensive rationale focused on both investment 
protection and avoiding protectionism. The study explained 
that: 
                                                          
39  Id. 
40  European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, The Economic 
Impact of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), at 33, (June 
2018), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/157116.htm. 
41  Id. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/2
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These new [corporate governance] commitments were made with 
the aim to: i) set high standards in corporate governance; ii) reduce 
behind-the-border barriers on investment arising from diverging 
regulations on the management of firms; and iii) increase investor 
confidence, investment and competitiveness.42 
The parliamentary study acknowledges the importance of 
investment, while also introducing two other goals.  First, it 
asserts a normative judgement: the EPA establishes “high 
standards,” implying that practices diverging from these 
principles would be, in effect, substandard and fail to promote 
investment and sustainable economic growth.43  Second, it 
reframes corporate governance as a “behind-the-border barrier” 
to trade—more similar to an effort that reduces the protectionist 
impact of countries’ differing regulatory regimes.44  The 
parliamentary study reframes corporate governance as another 
building block to encourage economic integration—on par with 
other technical regulatory alignments frequently included 









                                                          
42  Policy Department for External Relations, Directorate General for 
External Policies of the Union, Study of The EU-Japan Economic Partnership 
Agreement, at 20 (Sept. 2018),  
http://bruegel.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/EXPO_STU2018603880_EN.pdf
. 
43  Id. 
44  Marta Wajda-Lichy, Traditional Protectionism Versus Behind-the-
Border Barriers in the Post-Crisis Era: Experience of Three Groups of 
Countries: The EU, NAFTA and BRICS, 7 J. INT’L STUD. 141, 148 (2014) (listing 
examples such as: “technical barriers to trade, subsidies to exporters, 
administrative regulations concerning public procurement, sanitary and 
phytosanitary regulations”). 
45  See Reeve T. Bull et al., New Approaches to International Regulatory 
Cooperation: The Challenge of TTIP, TPP, and Mega-Regional Trade 
Agreements, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (2015) (discussing regulatory 
alignment efforts). 
13
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B. The Japanese Context: Corporate Governance Reforms for 
Economic Growth 
Japan engaged in extensive corporate governance reforms 
concurrently with the negotiation of the EPA.  “Abenomics,” 
named after Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, seeks to 
address long-standing barriers to economic growth through 
three “arrows”: monetary policy, financial stimulus, and 
structural reform.46  Corporate governance is a major element of 
structural reform, along with improved female workforce 
participation, education reform, and other industry-specific 
efficiency improvements.47 
 
This section focuses on Japan’s efforts given the extensive 
push among policymakers and private sector leaders in Tokyo to 
reform corporate governance.  The European Union certainly 
maintains an active corporate governance harmonization 
agenda.  However, the corporate governance chapter can be 
more easily seen as a response to Japan’s excessively pro-
manager corporate governance regime and traditional hostility 
to foreign control. 
 
Long-standing concerns with Japanese corporate 
governance have emerged in previous economic agreements.  In 
1990, Japan and the United States negotiated the Structural 
Impediments Initiative (SII) to address trade imbalances, with 
a focus on non-tariff contributors, including corporate 
governance.48  One initiative included increased enforcement 
against the kereitsu system,49 where extensive cross-holding of 
shares between different companies creating interlocking 
corporate relationships across the economy.50  The EPA’s 
                                                          
46  James McBride & Beina Xu, Abenomics and the Japanese Economy, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Mar. 23, 2018), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/abenomics-and-japanese-economy#chapter-
title-0-4. 
47  Rob Harding, The Third Arrow of Abenomics: A Scorecard, FIN. TIMES 
(Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/ee40a73c-521d-11e5-8642-
453585f2cfcd. 
48  Mitsuo Matsushita, The Structural Impediments Initiative: An 
Example of Bilateral Trade Negotiation, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 436, 436 (1990). 
49   See id. at 443 (discussing the kereitsu system). 
50  Taizo Wada, Asset Managers Raise Pressure on Japan’s Board 
Appointments, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (June 14, 2018), 
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corporate governance chapter can be seen as an extension of this 
decades-old concern about Tokyo’s trade and investment 
barriers. 
 
More recently, Milhaupt summarized the main challenges 
relevant to Japan’s corporate sector: 
(1) low profitability/low productivity of capital, reflected in the low 
return on equity (ROE) of Japanese firms in comparison to their 
global counterparts . . . (2) loss of international competitiveness, 
particularly in markets where Japanese firms were once global 
leaders . . . (3) weak internal compliance systems and lax board 
oversight, manifest in a series of widely publicized scandals.51 
Japanese corporate governance has tended to insulate 
management and exacerbate existing challenges.  In addition to 
the cross-holding of shares, former executives often fill seats on 
boards, undercutting oversight efforts unfavorable to current 
company management.52  Among shareholders, there is 
relatively little meaningful participation: hundreds of 
shareholder meetings are held on the same day of the year and 
a negative perception exists around activism.53 
 
The Abe government has engaged in multiple corporate 
governance reforms seeking to change laws, corporate behavior, 
and shareholder norms.  The 2015 Companies Act revision 
added a third board option to increase board effectiveness.54  The 
new framework eliminated the separate kansayaku board of 
auditors, and instead requires an audit committee composed of 
members of the board of directors.55  Reformers hoped this 
measure would encourage the addition of independent directors 
                                                          
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-trends/Asset-managers-raise-
pressure-on-Japan-s-board-appointments. 
51  Curtis J. Milhaupt, Evaluating Abe’s Third Arrow: How Significant are 
Japan’s Recent Corporate Governance Reforms? 1, 3 (Columbia Law & Econs., 
Working Paper No. 561, 2017). 
52  Eric Pfanner, Corporate Japan Looks for Outside Advice, WALL ST. J. 
(June 8, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/corporate-japan-looks-for-
outside-advice-1433789544. 
53  Hiroko Tabuchi, In Japan, Hundreds of Shareholder Meetings on Same 
Day, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/23/in-
japan-hundreds-of-shareholder-meetings-on-same-day/. 
54  Milhaupt, supra note 51, at 1. 
55  Id. at 4. 
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and address the perceived ineffectiveness of the boards of 
auditors, who do not have a vote on the board of directors.56  To 
improve shareholder oversight, a new Stewardship Code 
developed for institutional investors seeks to increase 
engagement and voting disclosure.57  Other updates in the 
Corporate Governance code push for independent directors, 
reduced cross-shareholdings (by requiring companies to explain 
the rationale and objective of cross-holdings), and improved 
disclosure.58 
C. Assessing the Text: Aspirational Language, and Highly 
Flexible Implementation 
The language of the EPA’s individual provisions highlights 
cornerstone concepts of corporate governance.  In its approach, 
the governance chapter provides guiding principles but refrains 
from requiring specific actions.  As a result, the text highlights 
Japan’s willingness to promote broadly-accepted corporate 
governance goals, but avoids the pitfalls of an overly-constricting 
agreement. 
 
The following section analyzes the different articles of the 
chapter: (1) Objectives, (2) General principles, (3) Rights of 
shareholders and ownership functions, (4) Roles of the board, 
and (5) Takeovers. 
1. Article I: Objectives 
The Corporate Governance chapter opens by stating the 
rationale for including corporate governance in the EPA.  The 
rhetoric aligns with the broader push by stakeholders and 
academics to consider corporate governance as a tool of economic 
development. 
 
For one, the parties link the chapter to economic growth.  
The parties recognize “the importance of an effective corporate 
governance framework to achieve economic growth through 
well-functioning markets and sound financial systems based on 
                                                          
56  Id. at 10. 
57  Id. at 4–5. 
58  Id. at 5. 
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transparency, efficiency, trust and integrity.”59  Next, the parties 
focus on investment protection as a means of fully following 
through on the agreement’s opportunities: “[e]ach party . . . 
recognize[s] that those [corporate governance] measures will 
attract and encourage investment by enhancing investor 
confidence and improving competitiveness, thus enabling best 
advantage to be taken of the opportunities granted by its 
respective market access commitments.”60 
 
The parties place the corporate governance commitments 
within the broader goals of facilitating market access: “[t]he 
Parties commit to respect the principles and adhere to the 
provisions of this Chapter to the extent that they facilitate 
access to each other’s markets . . . .”61  This text clarifies that the 
commitments respect each party’s autonomy in corporate 
governance (“[w]ithout limiting the ability of each Party to 
develop its own legal, institutional and regulatory framework in 
relation to the corporate governance of publicly listed 
companies . . .”).62  In a recurrent theme, the agreement specifies 
a certain standard, but nonetheless provides an open door for 
the parties to maintain, tailor, and experiment. 
2. Article III: General Principles 
The General Principles article addresses the typical agency 
issues of corporate governance.63 
 
First, the text encourages accountability in a myriad of 
relationships: between “management and the board towards 
shareholders,” between the management and the board, relying 
on “board decision-making based on an independent and 
objective standpoint,” and between shareholders, based on 
“equal treatment of shareholders of the same class.”64  In 
                                                          
59 Agreement between the European Union and Japan for Economic 
Partnership, Dec. 8, 2017, art. 15.1(1), available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/august/tradoc_157228.pdf#page=43
3 [hereinafter EU-Japan EPA].  
60  Id. art. 15.1(2). 
61  Id. art. 15.1(3). 
62  Id. 
63  Id. art. 15.3. 
64  Id. art. 15.3(1). 
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particular, the language around “independent” and “objectives” 
boards addresses the Japanese problem of excessive board 
deference to management.65 
 
The agreement also recognizes the importance of public 
disclosure, “including the financial situation, performance, 
ownership and governance of those companies.”66  Such policies 
are the cornerstone for robust capital markets. 
 
For implementation, the General Principles endorse 
comply-or-explain provisions, which align to both Japanese and 
European models.  Comply or explain provisions require 
companies to either implement a code’s requirements, or instead 
disclose a rationale for not doing so.67  Milhaupt finds comply-or-
explain regimes to be a particularly weak solution for the 
Japanese context, where companies who would benefit most 
from new corporate governance provisions choose to explain and 
not comply.68  Comply-or-explain approaches assume market 
pressures will force firms into efficient governance choices.69  
This approach reflects the existing policies of Japan and the 
European Union.70 
 
The parties also provide for exemptions to the agreement’s 
requirements, based on objective and nondiscriminatory 
criteria.71  The text provides examples—exclusions may apply 
based on a company’s size or early phase of development.72  
These exceptions appear to be reasonable.  Corporate 
governance requirements, particularly around disclosure, have 
                                                          
65  EU-Japan EPA, supra note 59, art. 15.3(2). 
66  Id. art. 15.3(1). 
67  See Maria Elisabeth Sturm, Corporate Governance in the EU and U.S.: 
Comply-or-Explain Versus Rule 1, 1–15 (Stanford-Vienna Transatlantic Tech. 
Law Forum, Working Paper No. 16, 2016). 
68  See Milhaupt, supra note 51, at 8 (critiquing the utility of comply-or-
explain for corporate governance reform in the Japanese context); see also 
George Hadjikyprianou, The Principle of ‘Comply or Explain’ Underpinning the 
UK Corporate Governance Regulations: Is There a Need for Change?, 7 CORP. 
GOVERNANCE L.J. 1, 3 (2015) (arguing against using “hard law” to address 
deficiencies in the U.K. comply-or-explain regime).   
69  Milhaupt, supra note 51, at 15. 
70  Id. at 6.  
71  EU-Japan EPA, supra note 59, art. 4.4(1). 
72  Id. art. 4.6. 
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historically generated complaints about the high cost and 
smaller benefit for certain classes of companies.  Again, the 
agreement allows for deviation and experimentation. 
3. Article IV: Rights of Shareholders and Ownership 
Functions 
Next, the agreement focuses on the rights of shareholders 
and ownership functions—principally, effective shareholder 
democracy and information disclosure.73  These sections focus on 
the goal of meaningful shareholder engagement and oversight, 
while avoiding specific rules. 
 
Addressing shareholder democracy, the agreement requires 
parties to allow “participation and voting in the general 
meeting” and “election and removal of members of the board.”74  
The agreement includes provisions “facilitating the effective 
exercise of shareholders’ rights . . . allowing shareholders to 
oversee board behaviour and participate in important decision-
making . . . .”75  Problematically, meetings of many Japanese 
companies are set for the same day of the year, limiting 
meaningful shareholder participation and voting in the general 
meetings.76  Furthermore, members of the board are often drawn 
from the ranks of managers of the firm—rather than serving as 
shareholder representatives.77  The EPA highlights the need for 
new practices. 
 
Meaningful decision-making also requires timely 
information disclosure.78  The disclosure provisions noted here 
complement the procedural push for shareholder democracy.  As 
examples, the provision suggests disclosure of “the capital 
structure, with an indication of the different classes of shares 
where appropriate, direct and indirect shareholdings which are 
considered to be significant, and special control rights.”79  This 
                                                          
73  Id. ch. 15. 
74  Id. art. 15.4(1). 
75  Id.  
76  Milhaupt, supra note 51, at 10. 
77  Id. at 15.  
78  Id. at 5. 
79  EU-Japan EPA, supra note 59, art. 15.4(2). 
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disclosure framework may help domestic investors argue for 
additional disclosure.  But, a disclosure regime may actually be 
more powerful for foreign investors—who are the primary 
targets of an investment agreement.  Foreign investors often 
face significant risk investing in a country with very different 
corporate governance laws and practices.80  For example, joint 
ventures in Brazil with foreign investors have a high failure rate 
in part because investors do not realize how to protect against 
partners with pyramidal controls.81  Similarly, the European 
and Japanese corporate governance models diverge 
significantly, raising issues of investor awareness and 
understanding of differing practices.82  Disclosure requirements 
focusing on control rights may help educate foreign investors 
and managers. 
4. Article V: Roles of the Board 
The agreement defines the types of board accountability and 
the means of achieving this accountability.  The agreement 
highlights three goals of board-related accountability: (1) the 
board’s effective monitoring of management; (2) board 
accountability to shareholders; and (3) disclosure of information 
about the board to shareholders.83 
 
Independent directors emerge as a tool for achieving this 
level of accountability.  The agreement promotes the “effective 
use of a sufficient number of independent directors” as a means 
of ensuring effective monitoring.84  The provision acknowledges 
a diversity of interpretations: “[e]ach Party may determine in its 
jurisdiction what constitutes a ‘sufficient number of independent 
directors’ in either qualitative or quantitative terms.”85  Such 
flexible terms match the needs of Japan and EU member states, 
given the diversity of corporate ownership patterns.  The 
                                                          
80  Susan Perkins et al., Innocents Abroad: The Hazards of International 
Joint Ventures with Pyramidal Group Firms, 4 GLOBAL STRATEGY J. 310, 311 
(2014). 
81  See id. at 311 (introducing data and drivers for the failure of joint 
ventures in Brazil). 
82  Id. at 312. 
83  EU-Japan EPA, supra note 59, art. 15.5. 
84  Id. art. 15.5(a). 
85  EU-Japan EPA, supra note 59, n. 126. 
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definition of independence should be determined based on the 
agency problem to be solved—for instance, in some countries, 
independence must be from dominant family owners or 
blockholders, while in countries dominated by diffuse 
shareholding, directors should be independent from corporate 
insiders.86 
 
Within Japan, a newly-emergent legal movement favoring 
independent directors aligns with the commitments made in the 
EPA.  The 2015 Corporate Governance Code requires companies, 
on a comply-or-explain basis, to appoint two or more 
independent directors.87  The agreement does not appear to 
require further action—but it does reiterate an underlying 
commitment to independent directors.  These provisions also 
align with OECD guidance, which promotes independent 
directors but recognizes the range of practices.88 
5. Article VI: Takeovers 
The takeover provisions involve short and weak language.  
Article 15.6 requires that “[e]ach Party shall provide rules and 
procedures governing takeovers in publicly listed companies. 
Such rules and procedures shall aim to enable those transactions 
to occur at transparent prices and under fair conditions.”89  This 
outcome reflects the lack of consensus within Europe or Japan 
on appropriate takeover laws.  Europe has historically had 
difficulty aligning takeover practices, resulting in watered-down 
                                                          
86  Gordon & Roe, supra note 15, at 36; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf 
Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Corporate Governance Standards, 157 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1263, 1302 (2009); Dan W. Puchniak & Umakanth Varottil, Related 
Party Transactions in Commonwealth Asia: Complexity Revealed 1–27 
(European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 404, 2018) (discussing 
the challenges of regulating related party transactions in Asian firms of 
varying ownership types). 
87  Jones et al., Japanese Corporate Governance is Changing with the 
Adoption of a New Code in 2015, JONES DAY (Feb. 2015), 
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2015/02/japanese-corporate-
governance-is-changing-with-the-adoption-of-a-new-code-in-2015. 
88  OECD, OECD Corporate Governance Factbook (2019), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporate-governance-factbook.htm (“National 
approaches on the definition of independence for independent directors vary 
considerably, particularly with regard to maximum tenure and independence 
from a significant shareholder.”). 
89  EU-Japan EPA, supra note 59, art. 15.6. 
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and non-binding EU policies.90  Japan, for its part, has had a 
long-standing anti-takeover orientation from the extensive 
cross-holding of shares91 and government approval of facially 
neutral takeover defenses.92  As a result, neither party has an 
interest in using the EPA to facilitate takeover activity. 
 
The provisions of the EPA tackle the details of corporate 
governance in an unprecedented manner.  Beyond individual 
provisions, broader theoretical questions emerge as to why 
corporate governance regulation has emerged in international 
economic agreements.  The following section proposes several 
explanations and applies those theories to the case of the EU-
Japan EPA. 
III. THE THEORETICAL RATIONALE FOR CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE REGULATION IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
AGREEMENTS 
Corporate governance provisions, interwoven within trade 
and investment agreements, represent an emerging avenue of 
legal diffusion.  This section addresses the theoretical rationale 
for corporate governance in international economic agreements. 
A. A Credible Commitment Mechanism 
Parties signing international agreements may use these 
documents as credible commitment mechanisms.  A 
straightforward reading of corporate governance provisions 
focuses on the substantive impact: international agreements 
provide specific rights, particularly for foreign investors or 
minority shareholders.  In some instances, compliance with an 
agreement requires domestic legal reforms that result in a more 
pro-investor orientation.  Reneging on these provisions 
constitutes a costly breach of international commitments.93 
                                                          
90  See Mark Humphrey-Jenner, The Impact of the EU Takeover Directive 
on Takeover Performance and Empire Building, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 254, 260–272 
(2012) (providing a history and critique of the EU Takeover Directive). 
91  Joseph Lee, The Current Barriers to Corporate Takeovers in Japan: Do 
the UK Takeover Code and the EU Takeover Directive Offer a Solution?, 18 
EURO. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 761, 766 (2017). 
92  Pargendler, supra note 24, at 23. 
93  See Robert O. Keohane, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE 
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International relations theory recognizes treaties as 
signaling devices.  Neumayer and Spess identify that “[Bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs)] are likely to fulfil the dual function 
of both signaling and commitment.”94  Büthe and Milner have 
identified the commitment mechanism as a key driver for the 
increase in foreign direct investment after the signing of an 
international trade agreement.95  Kerner postulates that the 
more BITs a country signs, the more credible its commitment is 
to treat foreign investors as good, or better, than its domestic 
counterparties.96  A less developed country may use the treaty 
as evidence of a newfound willingness to protect foreign 
investors’ property rights.  Researchers have postulated that the 
commitment signal increases investment for two subgroups of 
foreign investors: (1) foreign investors from the party nations, 
and (2) foreign investors from other, non-party nations.97  
Foreign investors from party nations would invest due to the 
substantive protections and signaling effect.  Meanwhile, non-
party foreign investors may increase investment due to the 
signaling inherent in signing these agreements. 
 
The signaling effect from corporate governance provisions 
are unlikely to apply uniformly.  Instead, there is likely a 
credibility requirement.  Tobin and Rose-Ackerman argue that 
the signaling benefit of a BIT “is dependent on the broader 
institutional environment in the host country.”98  Pistor argues 
                                                          
POWER: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 5 (1989) (discussing 
international regimes); see Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State 
Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819, 821 (2000) (discussing markets and international 
monetary law, specifically expectations regarding commitment and 
compliance). 
94  Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 3 WORLD DEV. 
1567, 1572 (2005) (identifying spill-over effects from signing a BIT that 
protects foreign investment). 
95  Tim Büthe & Helen V. Milner, The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment 
into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI Through International Trade 
Agreements?, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 741, 744 (2008). 
96  Andrew Kerner, Why Should I Believe You? The Costs and 
Consequences of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 53 INT’L STUD. Q. 73, 74 (2009). 
97   Neumayer & Spess, supra note 94, at 1571. 
98  Jennifer L. Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, When BITs have Some Bite: 
The Political-Economic Environment for Bilateral Investment Treaties, 6 REV. 
INT’L ORG. 1, 5 (2011). 
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that “reforms depend on the existence of a fairly developed and 
well-functioning legal infrastructure.  Absent this 
infrastructure, [standardization] reforms in the areas of 
accounting standards, securities legislation, insurance 
regulation, and even corporate governance will remain at the 
surface.”99 
B. Overcoming Domestic Opposition to Reform 
International agreements can wrestle control of the policy 
agenda away from domestic opposition to reform.  In their 
absence, nationalist instincts within corporate law may result in 
suboptimal governance regimes.100  For instance, economic 
agreements can wrest corporate governance away from certain 
business and political elites who benefit from protectionist 
policies. 
 
International organizations and scholars have recognized 
the potential impact of corporate governance commitments.  A 
World Bank analysis of Vietnam asserts that “[State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs)] corporate governance reforms would 
respond to TPP implementation needs and principles.”101  In 
discussions over a proposed China-EU BIT, advocates 
highlighted that an agreement would enable interest groups 
within the Chinese bureaucracy to push for better SOE 
governance.102 
 
Scholars have different assessments of the depth of 
potential opposition that international agreements must 
overcome.  Sykes, in discussing the broader category of 
                                                          
99  Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and its Effect on 
Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 100 (2002). 
100  Pargendler, supra note 24, at 3.  
101  World Bank and Vietnam Ministry of Industry and Trade, Seizing the 




102  See Alicia García-Herrero & Jianwei Xu, How to Handle State-owned 
Enterprises in EU-China Investment Talks, BRUEGEL 1, 6 (June 2017), 
http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/PC-18-2017_2.pdf (discussing 
the multiple binding and non-binding mechanisms for encouraging alignment 
in corporate governance standards in the EU and China). 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/2
2019 THE INT’L LAW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 81 
investment protectionism, asserts that such protections benefit 
from less popular support than trade protectionism.103  He 
explains that “barriers to inbound investment will protect 
domestic capital but may create no benefit or even cause harm 
to domestic labor because foreign investors often employ 
significant amounts of domestic labor in their operations.”104  
Thus, labor’s benefits from the free flow of capital would reduce 
popular support for investment barriers. 
 
On the other hand, this reading underplays the possibility 
of a broader anti-foreign alliance: labor and other interest 
groups may also embrace investment protectionism.  Foreign 
business owners may be less tied to the local community and 
more freely push for cost-cutting measures.105  Foreign-owned 
firms may embrace international supply chains at the expense 
of local producers.  More broadly, foreign owners may be less 
cognizant of negative externalities, and foreign management 
and shareholders are less likely to experience those impacts.106  
Corporate governance thus falls into the same theme as other 
areas tackled by the agreements—another subject matter where 
an international commitment is needed to overcome opposition 
by an alliance of domestic interest groups.107 
C. Changing Domestic Norms 
Corporate governance provisions also serve a more 
intermediary function of changing domestic norms.  While the 
previous explanation assumed that provisions actually have a 
direct substantive impact on domestic corporate law, the 
provisions might be written to have little binding impact.108  In 
such cases, provisions may instead function to change the 
domestic conversation on corporate governance standards. 
 
                                                          
103  Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of International Investment 
Agreements with Implications for Treaty Interpretation and Design, 113 AM. J. 
INT’L. L. 482, 489 (2019). 
104  Id. 
105  Pargendler, supra note 24, at 39 (discussing the potential divergence 
between foreign owners and local managers). 
106  Id. at 7. 
107  Id. at 3. 
108  See infra Section III.B. 
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The clearest analogy emerges from the experience of 
shareholder activist battles.  Kahan and Rock have identified 
controversies over seemingly meaningless provisions as 
examples of low-impact, but high-volume, conflicts between 
domestic activist investors, managers of firms, and other 
stakeholder groups.109  They have advanced that “activism has a 
significant ‘symbolic’ element and cannot be fully explained by 
the material stakes at issue in a given controversy.”110  These 
fights aim to project power and change behavioral norms (rather 
than necessarily achieve high-impact results). 
 
The codification of corporate governance commitments in 
international agreements may serve to educate domestic actors 
on proper standards.  Looking at changing U.S. norms, Kahan 
and Rock see that, “[i]n the shift in U.S. boardrooms from a 
managerial conception of the board to a more ‘shareholder-
centric’ view, these [activist] battles almost certainly were 
important in reorienting directors’ understanding of their 
roles.”111  Provisions in international provisions may have a 
similar role as activist battles: as tools to reshape a country’s 
corporate governance norms, even without substantive legal 
changes. 
D. Reducing Differential Costs in Compliance and Transactions 
Individual nations’ varying disclosure requirements result 
in companies facing different compliance costs based on their 
legal domicile.  Standardizing requirements for disclosure can 
(1) eliminate the cost advantage of competitors subject to a less 
onerous disclosure regime; and (2) reduce the cost of investing in 
different jurisdictions.  In jurisdictions with less onerous 
disclosure requirements, compliance costs less—leading to lower 
recurring legal and financial control costs.  Companies in higher-
regulated jurisdictions may face a competitive disadvantage on 
the basis of regulatory differences, rather than operational or 
                                                          
109  See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance 
Politics, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1997, 1998–99 (2014) (discussing ongoing corporate 
debates such as poison pill proposals, proxy access, majority voting, and 
supermajority requirements). 
110  Id. at 1998–99. 
111  Id. at 2024. 
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strategic performance.112  Another impact of compliance costs 
emerges through investors themselves.  Investors operating in 
different jurisdictions must spend considerable sums navigating 
the thicket of unique rules governing business entities in each 
jurisdiction.  International agreements can establish greater 
coherence among different legal regimes.  At a minimum, 
agreements could supply a common terminology or framework.  
More comprehensive agreements can force parties to adapt 
similar specifications that reduce the expenses of learning, 
navigating, and complying with the rules.113 
E. Cross-Border Gains and Losses from Domestic Corporate 
Governance 
The push to harmonize global corporate governance 
standards may emerge, in part, from the realization that the bad 
corporate governance can result in cross-border harm.  The East 
Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s demonstrated the 
systemic risk to entire regions from weak governance.114  As the 
downturn began, managers and controlling shareholders began 
expropriating value.  Managers began moving money offshore 
while other firms transferred funds to related companies (to the 
detriment of minority shareholders).115  These actions had broad 
regional implications by exacerbating the existing trend of 
capital outflows, the fall of exchange rates, and cratering 
investor confidence.116 
 
                                                          
112  See generally Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities 
Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 
1335 (1999) (further discussing the benefits of standardized disclosure).   
113  See Luca Enriques, Company Law Harmonization Reconsidered: What 
Role for the EC? 9–10 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 
53, 2005) (discussing how the transactional benefits of corporate law 
harmonization have been discussed in the context of the European Union, and 
recognizing that in theory, harmonization may reduce transaction costs, but in 
practice, European Commission actions have created overly rigid rules that 
actually raise transaction costs and fail to address market failures). 
114  IMF, Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Financial 
Stability in Emerging Markets, in GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: 
FOSTERING STABILITY IN A LOW GROWTH, LOW-RATE ERA, 82 (Oct. 2016) 
(discussing how weak corporate governance contributes to global instability). 
115  Simon Johnson et al., Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial 
Crisis, 58 J. FIN. ECONS. 141, 142–43 (2000). 
116  Id. at 142. 
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Conversely, the benefits of good corporate governance may 
also flow across national borders.  Academics have promoted 
good corporate governance as a tool for spurring economic 
growth in developing countries—leading to increased 
opportunities for trade and investment.117 
F. Addressing the Pitfalls of Homogenizing Agreements 
Homogeneity reduces the diversity of corporate governance 
regimes.  Ideally, parties would standardize on an optimal 
regime, but parties may also end up in a sub-optimal state.  In 
particular, too-rigid requirements may be appropriate for one 
party, and not another, with homogenization placing barriers to 
the natural evolution of law.  Pistor argues that “[t]he 
standardization of ‘best practice’ or ‘efficient’ law replaces the 
Schumpeterian process of ‘creative destruction’ with the ideal of 
the ‘perfect construction’ of law.”118  The pitfalls of such 
displacement are the side effects of the commitment mechanism: 
standardization requires countries to adhere potentially 
suboptimal legal regimes, with high costs of reneging or 
changing the agreements.119 
 
Homogeneity exposes the global economic system to the 
same pitfalls, as standardized widespread rules leave all 
countries with immunity to one set of problems and 
vulnerability to another set of problems.  Romano has posited 
that the Basel architecture for financial regulation increases 
systemic financial risk.120  In her reading, “[b]y incentivizing 
financial institutions worldwide to follow broadly similar 
business strategies, regulatory error contributed to a global 
financial crisis.”121  Similarly, encouraging converging corporate 
governance standards may also result in an analogous 
                                                          
117  See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 
J. FIN. 1131, 1132 (1997) (identifying the pathways explaining how good 
corporate governance leads to capital growth). 
118  Pistor, supra note 99, at 98. 
119  Id. at 104 (“[I]n most cases, harmonization will lock a large number of 
jurisdictions into suboptimal rules and prevent flexible adaptation to better 
rules and changing circumstances.”). 
120  Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of 
Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture, 31 
YALE J. REG. 1, 6 (2014). 
121  Id. at 1. 
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regulatory error. 
 
However, corporate governance provisions often specify 
principles, rather than mandatory rules.  The flexible nature of 
corporate governance agreements thus departs from the 
rigidness, and pitfalls, of other accords, such as the Basel 
architecture. 
G. Comparing the EU-Japan EPA to Theoretical Explanations 
The EPA’s corporate governance provisions align with a 
subset of the theoretical explanations explaining corporate 
governance regulation in international agreements. 
 
First, the EPA’s corporate governance chapter can serve as 
a commitment mechanism.122  Japan has now provided a treaty-
level commitment to corporate governance principles.123  The 
country has a strong rule-of-law environment, giving credence to 
the government’s ability to implement commitments.  
Problematically, despite these commitments, the parties 
excluded the corporate governance chapter from the EPA’s 
dispute resolution mechanism.124  As a result, neither party will 
have an effective way to challenge the implementation of the 
chapter, other than via diplomatic pressure.  Again, the 
agreement appears to highlight the parties’ renewed focus on 
corporate governance while avoiding truly binding impacts. 
 
The agreement may also support changing domestic norms.  
While Japan has implemented legal reforms and a new Code of 
Conduct, these changes are only meaningful with actual take-up 
among the corporate community.  An international agreement 
can provide another jolt out of an excessively insider-captured 
mindset and encourage more shareholder oversight. 
 
By contrast, the explanation of overcoming domestic 
opposition is relatively weaker in this case.  Japan already 
engaged in reforms prior to this agreement, so the country 
                                                          
122  EU-Japan EPA, supra note 59, Ch. 15. 
123  Id.  
124  EU-Japan EPA, supra note 59, art. 15.7 (discussing the process of 
mediation and arbitration panels for disputes). 
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already appears largely in compliance with the agreement’s 
language.125  Nor is there any evidence that the agreement 
pushed forward this tide of domestic reform.126  Looking ahead, 
the provisions are unlikely to serve a major role in forcing action 
from reluctant domestic parties.127 
 
Finally, the agreement appears to make minimal efforts at 
reducing the differential costs of compliance and transactions.  
Investors may benefit slightly from Article IV’s disclosure 
provisions, which bring transparency to control rights among 
shareholders.128  Such information can ease the challenges of due 
diligence and structuring investment.  However, this agreement 
does not delve into sufficient details to meaningful address 
differential costs.129 
 
The EPA provides a new opening for the study of 
comparative corporate governance, highlighting how 
international agreements may take on a more significant role in 
shaping domestic corporate law.  The agreement provides the 
appropriate gestures towards convergence, with the parties 
defining and embracing shared vocabulary and text around the 
goals of corporate governance.130  The chapter ultimately 
emerges as a signaling exercise, maintaining significant leeway 
for each party to interpret and implement its provisions.131 
IV. PROVISIONS IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IMPACTING 
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 
Even before the EU-Japan Economic Partnership 
Agreement, international agreements have impacted corporate 
governance.  This subject has remained largely ignored in 
existing legal scholarship, which focuses extensively on domestic 
corporate law.  In state-to-state agreements, explicit provisions 
and secondary impacts have redrawn the rights of shareholders, 
                                                          
125  See infra Section II.B. 
126  See infra Sections III.B, III.C. 
127  See infra Sections III.B, III.C. 
128  Id. art. 14. 
129  EU-Japan EPA, supra note 59, Annex 23. 
130  Id. art. 7.12. 
131  Id. Ch. 7. 
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directors, management, and other stakeholders.  The following 
section covers three topics: (1) accountability and composition of 
management and boards; (2) state-owned enterprises; and (3) 
the equality of shareholders. 
A. Accountability and Composition of Management and Boards 
International agreements include provisions permitting or 
restricting nationality restrictions on members of the board and 
corporate management.  The provisions touch on a core question 
in corporate governance: the composition of a company’s 
leadership.132  Such limitations undercut the power of investors 
to freely nominate board members, who in turn, may not freely 
hire corporate officers.  Such provisions can encourage 
convergence towards greater investor control of boards and 
management.133 
1. Nationality Restrictions on Management 
The recent Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) language 
typifies frequent language pertaining to discrimination based on 
nationality.  For management roles, the TPP completely 
disallows such discrimination: “[n]o Party shall require that an 
enterprise of that Party that is a covered investment appoint to 
a senior management position a natural person of any particular 
nationality.”134 
 
Investors may gain confidence to invest as anti-
discrimination provisions can boost enterprise performance and 
mitigate the agency costs of using a purely local management 
team.  As a starting matter, anti-discrimination provisions 
enable investors to tap into a global labor pool.  Foreign 
managers can arrive with a proven track records and expertise 
unavailable in the local market.  These experienced managers 
can use their expertise to strengthen a company’s 
performance.135  Second, anti-discrimination provisions may also 
                                                          
132  EU-Japan EPA, supra note 59, art. 15.3(2). 
133 Id. art. 15.4(2). 
134  See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Ch. 9, art. 11(1), Off. of 
Trade Representative, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-
Investment.pdf [hereinafter TPP]. 
135  See, e.g., Ksenia Yudaeva et al., Does Foreign Ownership Matter? The 
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reduce agency issues between shareholders and management.136  
While domestic managers may bring important local knowledge, 
these same links may actually disadvantage performance.  
Managers are likely linked to other market players through 
social connections and as repeat players.  As a result, domestic 
managers may accrue significant non-pecuniary benefits that 
extend beyond the scope of employment, such as social capital 
and future employment opportunities.  These benefits may 
prevent managers from taking a course of action beneficial to 
shareholders but detrimental to managers’ local standing.  In a 
more extreme example, domestic managers may decline to 
implement cost-cutting initiatives to avoid angering local 
suppliers, employees, and other stakeholders.  Thus, local 
management’s incentives would diverge from those of foreign 
shareholders, exacerbating the perennial problem of agency 
costs between shareholders and management.  By contrast, 
foreign managers may be more aligned to shareholder 
incentives, given the lower likelihood of these non-pecuniary 
benefits.137  Taken in sum, provisions restricting nationality-
based discrimination can strengthen investor confidence by 
improving enterprise performance and reducing agency costs. 
2. Nationality Restrictions on Board Members 
By contrast, the TPP and other agreements frequently do 
permit some nationality restrictions on board members: 
[A] Party may require that a majority of the board of directors, or 
any committee thereof, of an enterprise of that Party that is a 
covered investment, be of a particular nationality or resident in the 
territory of the Party, provided that the requirement does not 
                                                          
Russian Experience, 11 ECON. OF TRANSITIONAL AND INSTIT. CHANGE 383 
(hypothesizing that Russian “foreign-owned firms can benefit from managerial 
experience and the distribution network of their foreign owners.”). 
136  See Anders Edström & Jay R. Galbraith, Transfer of Managers as a 
Coordination and Control Strategy in Multinational Organizations, 22 ADMIN. 
SCI. Q. 248 (discussing the use of foreign managers as a means of effective 
decentralized control). 
137  See, e.g., Masayasu Ito & Takashi Sugimoto, Carlos Ghosn: The 
Expensive Cost Cutter, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (Nov. 20, 2018, 5:56 JST), 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Nissan-s-Ghosn-crisis/Carlos-Ghosn-The-
expensive-cost-cutter (comparing Carlos Ghosn’s implementation of cost-
cutting and workforce reduction in Nissan to the apparent conservatism of 
Japanese managers). 
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materially impair the ability of the investor to exercise control over 
its investment.138 
Such restrictions may be justified on the basis of legal 
enforceability and stakeholder-leaning corporate governance.  
The enforceability of legal judgements is particularly difficult 
against foreign board members.  Foreign board members may 
avoid liability by fleeing a jurisdiction, and likely have few in-
country assets.  By contrast, domestic courts may more easily 
enforce judgments on locally-based board members, who are 
more likely to have in-country interests and assets.  Nationality 
requirements prevent corporate directors from skirting the 
reach of domestic law. 
 
In addition, nationality requirements promote stakeholder 
consideration and reduce shareholder dominance.  Domestic 
directors tied to the domestic context may serve as a check on 
the profit-making motives of a company, similar to the dynamic 
noted above with domestic executives.  Boards with heavy 
domestic representation may be less likely to engage in 
corporate activities damaging to corporate stakeholders, such as 
layoffs.  Nationality restrictions could even mitigate national 
security risks.  For instance, the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States requires boards to nominate 
highly trusted individuals, including former intelligence and 
military officials.139 Nationality restrictions can serve as a low-
touch mechanism to achieve the same protective effect, 
assuming domestic directors also view their roles as protecting 
their home nations’ security interests. 
 
Despite these justifications for nationality restrictions, the 
provisions may come at the cost of a level playing field in 
managerial labor markets, and even firm performance.  
Miletkov et al. have found a positive association between foreign 
directors and firm performance under certain conditions; in 
particular, the association “is more positive in countries with 
                                                          
138  TPP, supra note 134, art. 11(2).  
139  See generally Andrew Verstein, The Corporate Governance of National 
Security, 95 WASH. U. L. R. 775, 775 (2018) (detailing CFIUS practices 
impacting the corporate governance of companies involved in sensitive 
national security matters).  
33
90 PACE INT’L L. REV. Vol. 32:1 
lower quality legal institutions, and when the director comes 
from a country with higher quality legal institutions than the 
firm’s host country.”140  Restrictions on the share of foreign 
directors may undercut this potential mechanism for improved 
firm performance. 
 
In contrast to the TPP and other agreements, the European 
Union—Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) does not allow any nationality restriction for 
boards: “[a] Party shall not require that an enterprise of that 
Party, that is also a covered investment, appoint to senior 
management or board of director positions, natural persons of 
any particular nationality.”141  Both parties have strong legal 
systems, highly-integrated economies, and an explicit project of 
cross-border integration.  As a result, the agreement prioritizes 
the free flow of highly skilled labor and a vibrant cross-border 
market for oversight and management.  Each individual 
jurisdiction has much lower concerns about the enforceability of 
judgments and the need to maintain locally-tied directors or 
officers.  The European Union—Canada agreement presents a 
counterexample to the TPP, which involves countries of different 
economic weights, legal systems, and sensitivity to foreign 
ownership.142  Countries of similar levels of openness to trade, 
economic development, and the rule of law may more readily 
embrace nationality nondiscrimination for boards. 
B. State-Owned Enterprises: Equality of Market Participants, 
Disclosure, and Conflicted Transactions 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and government-
authorized monopolies play leading economic roles in countries 
with underdeveloped private markets.  International 
agreements have increasingly tackled SOEs due to their 
government-provided benefits, including preferential treatment 
in taxes, regulations, direct or indirect transfers, and 
                                                          
140  Mihail Miletkov et al., Foreign Independent Directors and the Quality 
of Legal Institutions, 48 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 1, 1 (2016). 
141  See European Union—Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA), Oct. 30, 2016, art. 8.8, available at https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:22017A0114(01) 
[hereinafter CETA]. 
142  TPP, supra note 134. 
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government purchasing.  These benefits tend to disadvantage 
foreign companies and foreign investors, as domestic SOEs 
obtain preferential market access and an unfair cost advantage.  
Provisions tackling the governance of state-owned enterprises 
impact broader corporate governance issues, including the 
equality of market participants, disclosure standards, and 
conflicted transactions. 
 
In recent years, the OECD has produced an influential set 
of guidelines focused on this subfield of corporate governance—
the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned 
Enterprises.143  This document complements the G20/OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance with a more specific effort to 
address the challenges of government ownership.  On the one 
hand, these efforts are a domestic matter—countries benefit 
from SOEs that operate “efficiently, transparently and in an 
accountable manner.”144  Many essential public services, such as 
utilities, are provided by SOEs and monopolies.145  On the other 
hand, SOE governance is also a challenge on the global stage, as 
these enterprises operate and invest outside the domestic 
context.  The OECD explains the importance of SOE corporate 
governance outside home markets: “[a] number of countries are 
paying increasing attention to the foreign SOEs that operate in 
their jurisdictions—including in the context of trade and 
investment agreements—with a view to gauging their 
commercial orientations and likely impacts on the competitive 
landscape.”146  The presence of government-owned “golden 
shares,” and along with other formal and informal mechanisms 
for government influence, may create significant discrepancies 
between the behavior of SOEs and privately-held corporations 
engaged in cross-border trade and investments.147  The rise of 
the Chinese economy raises particular issues: Beijing has 
created numerous state-controlled “national champions” that 
provide a seemingly successful alternative to liberal economies’ 
                                                          
143  OECD, OECD GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-
OWNED ENTERPRISES 3 (2015) [hereinafter OECD Corporate Guidelines]. 
144  Id. at 11. 
145  Id. 
146  Id. at 8. 
147  Id. at 52. 
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preference for private ownership.148 
 
Recent trade and investment agreements, such as the TPP, 
have reflected concerns about the distortionary impact of 
government ownership.  The solutions to these concerns about 
SOEs touch on the basic principles of corporate governance.   
1. Equality between Foreign and Domestic Actors 
Provisions covering SOEs can promote equality in 
treatment between foreign and domestic entities.  Governments 
may use procurement or other commercial transactions in SOEs 
to favor domestic entities at the expense of foreign companies 
and investors.  Article 17.4 of the TPP, dealing with “Non-
discriminatory Treatment and Commercial Considerations,” 
requires parties to “act[] in accordance with commercial 
considerations in its purchase or sale of a good or service, except 
to fulfil any terms of its public service mandate.”149  Foreign 
enterprises must receive “treatment no less favourable than . . . 
[treatment received] by enterprises of the Party, of any other 
Party or of any non-Party.”150  In effect, these provisions create 
a minimum floor of treatment that applies to both domestic or 
foreign entities.  The emphasis on commercial considerations 
and national non-discrimination work against the protectionism 
built into many SOEs’ business models. 
2. Disclosure and Transparency 
International agreements covering SOEs emphasize 
disclosure and transparency provisions as a tool for fairer 
market access and oversight.  The disclosure regime typically 
requires party nations to provide information explaining SOEs’ 
governance structure and financial information—pushing SOEs 
towards similar disclosure requirements as for publicly-held 
companies.  For instance, Article 17.10 of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership requires parties to identify state-owned enterprises 
on an official public-facing website.151  Parties may request more 
                                                          
148  Id. at 29. 
149  TPP, supra note 134, art. 17.4. 
150  Id. art. 17.4. 
151  Id. art. 17.10. 
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detailed information about the listed entities.152  Such 
information includes important powers based on the 
government’s position as a shareholder: 
[T]he percentage of shares that the Party, its state-owned 
enterprises or designated monopolies cumulatively own, and the 
percentage of votes that they cumulatively hold, in the entity. . . a 
description of any special shares or special voting or other rights 
that the Party, its state-owned enterprises or designated 
monopolies hold, to the extent these rights are different than the 
rights attached to the general common shares of the entity.153 
Transparency requirements also provide insight on the 
commercial orientation of the enterprise. Parties are required to 
reveal: 
[T]he entity’s annual revenue and total assets over the most recent 
three year period for which information is available . . . any 
exemptions and immunities from which the entity benefits under 
the Party’s law; and . . . any additional information regarding the 
entity that is publicly available, including annual financial reports 
and third-party audits, and that is sought in the written request.154 
Additional provisions also require disclosure of “any policy 
or program . . . for non-commercial assistance,” its legal basis, 
and policy objectives.155 
 
These requirements not only force disclosure about publicly-
owned enterprises, but also establish a broader norm around 
transparency.  The transparency provisions may exceed the 
existing regulations under domestic law. 
3. Mitigating Conflicted Transactions 
Trade negotiators are concerned with indirect subsidies 
from SOEs giving an unfair advantage to domestic 
enterprises.156  Provisions that require SOEs to apply 
commercial considerations in transactions attempt to halt this 
                                                          
152  Id. art. 17.10(3).  
153  Id. art. 17.10. 
154  Id. art. 17.10. 
155  TPP, supra note 134, art 17.10. 
156  Id. art. 17.6. 
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form of market distortion.  Surprisingly, these same provisions 
can also address the broader governance issues stemming from 
improper related-party transactions (RPTs). 
 
Improper RPTs involve an insider or dominant shareholder 
engaging in a transaction for the purpose of siphoning wealth.157  
Such behavior, termed “tunneling,” transfers value from the 
company to another entity controlled by a dominant shareholder 
or a corporate insider.158  In cases where a dominant shareholder 
extracts resources, minority shareholders lose the value of their 
investment.159  In cases where a corporate insider extracts 
resources, shareholders as a class lose the value of their 
investment.160  Such transfers of wealth can be used to support 
other companies owned by the controlling shareholder—a 
phenomenon termed “propping.”161  In related corporate groups, 
some companies may suffer from tunneling, while 
simultaneously, other companies in the corporate group may 
benefit from propping.162 
 
These trends are present and problematic for SOEs.  RPTs 
between a government and its controlled company provide 
opportunities for siphoning wealth from minority private 
shareholders by mispricing assets.  For instance, a controlled oil 
company may purchase government-held exploration rights at 
an inflated value, or the government may underpay for 
electricity produced by a controlled utility.163  These transactions 
hurt private shareholders in the enterprises and benefit the 
                                                          
157  Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. ASS’N. 22, 22 (2000). 
158  Id. 
159  Id. at 24.  
160  Id. at 22. 
161  Eric Friedman et al., Propping and Tunneling, 31 J. COMP. ECONS. 
732, 733 (2003). 
162  Curtis Milhaupt & Mariana Pargendler, RPTs in SOEs: Tunneling, 
Propping, and Policy Channeling 1, 3–4 (European Corp. Governance Inst., 
Working Paper No. 386, 2018). 
163   Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2917, 2941–42 (2012) (discussing how the Brazilian 
government is suspected to have leveraged its majority control of the oil 
company Petrobras to receive excessive payments for the purchase of oil 
exploration rights); Milhaupt & Pargendler, supra note 162, at 3 (discussing 
how the government used its control of the electric utility Eletrobras to 
renegotiate contracts on terms unacceptable to private actors). 
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government as a controlling shareholder.  In cases where SOE 
insiders (e.g., managers) engage in improper RPTs, the 
transactions may actually hurt all shareholders, including the 
government and private investors. 
 
Beyond RPTs, governments can use SOEs to achieve public 
policy or political objectives.  Such “policy channeling” sacrifices 
financial returns for political pay-off, hurting the interests of 
private investors.164  As an example, providing cheap fertilizer 
from a government company benefits farmers at the expense of 
shareholders—but since farmers are not related parties, the 
traditional tools of corporate law to cleanse such transactions 
would not apply.  Under standard corporate law, there is an 
assumption that shareholders—and especially controlling 
shareholders—will monitor and prevent activities that do not 
contribute to profitability.  However, the government obtains a 
non-pecuniary benefit from these transactions—its upside is 
measured in votes during an election, or popular support for an 
autocratic regime, and not in financial returns. 
 
International agreements can limit “tunneling” behaviors 
by requiring commercial considerations (with narrow public 
policy exemptions).  These provisions originally emerged to level 
the playing field between domestic and foreign actors.  The same 
provisions also reduce the opportunities for the state or insiders 
to expropriate wealth from private shareholders.165  Take, for 
example, an SOE with majority government ownership and 
private minority investors.  Under provisions requiring 
commercial considerations, the government cannot use 
uneconomical transactions to unfairly “tunnel” resources from 
the partially-privatized SOE to other enterprises.  In such a 
case, private investors in the SOE benefit from the protections 
of the economic agreement.166 
 
                                                          
164  Milhaupt & Pargendler, supra note 162, at 5. 
165  Id. at 6 (discussing how fair treatment also works to bring additional 
players into constrained domestic markets, as foreign companies and private 
domestic companies can gain equal footing). 
166  Id. at 3 (discussing how the constraints of commercial considerations 
may harm minority investors in the subset of SOEs that had previously 
benefited from the government “propping” the SOE). 
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International agreements tackling SOEs may solve other 
existing gaps in corporate law by empowering foreign 
enterprises as monitors.  Milhaupt and Pargendler have 
outlined that existing corporate law based, on shareholder 
oversight may be unable to stop certain “propping” activities: 
Corporate law strategies are generally conceived with the interests 
of shareholders in mind, who often play a key role in their 
enforcement. This means that, even when they work well (which is 
often not the case in jurisdictions where SOEs are prevalent), these 
strategies may help deter tunneling, which harms shareholders, but 
not propping, which benefits shareholders . . . .167 
Agreements can similarly fill “propping” activities.  Foreign 
enterprises, empowered by the agreements, have a vested 
interest in identifying and stopping propping activities between 
the government and competitor SOEs.  
4. Limitations of Current SOE Provisions 
While international agreements present opportunities to 
improve corporate governance, some details within the 
agreements limit the functionality of the provisions. 
 
For instance, in some cases, the very definition of the SOE 
limits the usefulness of the previously discussed provisions.  The 
TPP defines SOEs as: 
[E]nterprises . . . engaged in commercial activities in which a 
Party . . . directly owns more than 50 per cent of the share 
capital . . . controls, through ownership interests, the exercise of 
more than 50 per cent of the voting rights; or . . . holds the power to 
appoint a majority of members of the board of directors or any other 
equivalent management body.168 
The definition leaves out many instances in which the 
government can exercise decisive control as a minority 
shareholder.  In such contexts, the government may form an 
implicit or explicit agreement with other dominant shareholders 
to defer to government preferences.  The government clearly has 
the upper hand, with vast powers to change tax and regulatory 
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preferences.  In addition, politicians often have links to broader 
stakeholders that may pressure a corporation—such as 
employee unions.  In cases where dispersed shareholders hold 
the remaining control rights, the state, even with a minority 
stake, could exert effective control. 
 
Treaties should incorporate a more flexible standard for 
government control.  The EU-Vietnam Agreement defines SOEs 
to include instances where a party “can exercise control over the 
strategic decisions of the enterprise.”169  This definition allows 
for an enterprise-specific analysis of government control, rather 
than using a binary analysis of whether the state is a majority 
owner.170 
 
Another weakness emerges from the multitude of 
exemptions providing safe harbors for many SOEs.171  The public 
interest and public service exemption in the TPP permits 
commercial activities on a non-commercial basis.172  Especially 
problematic is the exclusion of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs).  
SWFs serve broad roles in the allocation of capital and exercise 
of governance rights in domestic and foreign corporations.  The 
1MBD scandal, involving the Malaysian sovereign wealth fund, 
underlined that SWFs can suffer from similar tunneling issues 
as more traditional SOEs.173  Finally, nations may carve out 
specific provisions applicable only to their own enterprises.  In 
the TPP, such policies may focus on favoring particular ethnic 
groups—Malaysia protects its Bumiputera affirmative action 
program for ethnic Malays, while Australia protected 
preferences for indigenous people.174  Similarly, entire sectors 
                                                          
169  European Union-Vietnam Trade and Investment Protection 
Agreement, Sept. 24, 2018, art. 11.1 [hereinafter EVIPA]. 
170  Id.  
171  Id. at 11. 
172  See generally Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 
U.S. EMBASSY IN URUGUAY (Oct. 6, 2015), https://uy.usembassy.gov/summary-
trans-pacific-partnership-agreement/ (discussing the summary of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement). 
173  Shamim Adam et al., The Story of Malaysia’s 1MDB, the Scandal That 
Shook the World of Finance, BLOOMBERG (May 24, 2018, 3:05 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-24/how-malaysia-s-1mdb-
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174  Chin Y. Whah & Benny Teh Cheng Guan, Malaysia’s Protracted 
Affirmative Action Policy and the Evolution of the Bumiputera Commercial and 
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may be excluded, including electricity for Mexico and Vietnam, 
oil and gas for Malaysia, and certain financial services for the 
United States.175 
 
As a final note, while much of this discussion has focused on 
the implicit corporate governance regulation of SOEs in 
agreements, the recent EU-Vietnam agreement has actually 
explicitly brought the issue to the fore.  The agreement discusses 
corporate governance under the broader discussion of the 
“Regulatory Framework”: “[t]he Parties shall endeavour to 
ensure that state-owned enterprises, enterprises granted special 
rights or privileges, and designated monopolies observe 
internationally recognized standards of corporate 
governance.”176  The EU-Vietnam agreement is relatively soft—
the parties merely “shall endeavor”—but, it provides an explicit 
instance of corporate governance situated in the context of SOE 
regulation.177 
C. Equality of Shareholders in the Same Class 
The OECD Principles on Corporate Governance establish 
that corporate governance should promote “equal treatment for 
foreign and domestic shareholders,” and that, “all shareholders 
of the same series of a class should be treated equally.”178  In a 
departure from the other instances noted above, international 
agreements often infringe on these principles by providing 
additional protections to foreign investors, above and beyond the 
protections offered to their domestic counterparts.179  These 
unequal rights artificially skew corporate decision-making and 
capital markets.  These protections represent a tension with 
other agreements that have promoted and signaled greater 
commitment to corporate governance tenets. 
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Under AMLO: Challenges and Opportunities, RICE U. BAKER INST. PUB. POL’Y, 
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This quandary emerges from foreign investors’ 
disadvantage: they have relatively less influence via established 
political mechanisms to protect their investment, especially 
from government expropriation.  In addition, some countries’ 
weaker institutional settings raise the risks of all investment—
foreign and domestic—as property rights and contract 
enforcement are less secure.  Investment protections in treaties 
minimize these risks and reduce the cost of capital for inbound 
investment. 
 
Protections promoting the equal treatment of 
shareholders—whether domestic or foreign—can promote 
investment.  First, the transferability of shares increases, as the 
value of shares does not vary based on the nationality of the 
shareholder.  If one set of investors has fewer legal rights than 
another, the weaker investor class will discount the value of the 
investment to account for the increased risk.  A discrepancy 
between the market price for investment and an individual 
shareholder’s valuation, adjusted for legal risk, undercuts 
capital market liquidity.  Equal treatment ensures that 
individual investors do not discount the market value of an 
investment based on discriminatory legal treatment. 
 
Second, the battle for corporate control may become more 
dynamic, as foreign investors would face fewer barriers to 
buying or selling stakes on the basis of nationality.  Transfers of 
corporate control, or the threat of such transfers, constitute a 
mechanism of market-driven discipline.  Boards and 
management are aware that a new shareholder may purchase a 
controlling stake and impose new board and management 
members.  Equal treatment of foreign shareholders strengthens 
this mechanism for improved firm performance by creating a 
more active market for corporate control.  Problematically, 
protections for foreign shareholders often exceed parity, and 
instead, place domestic shareholders at a distinct disadvantage. 
 
The first of the three categories regulating the treatment of 
foreign investors, national treatment provisions, support 
equality.  Parties are forbidden from discriminating in favor of 
domestic investors. The typical language, here excerpted from 
the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, compels that: 
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Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no 
less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own 
investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments in its territory.180 
Next, agreements also include a most-favored nation (MFN) 
provision, which sets a minimum floor for treatment based on 
the treatment provided to non-parties.  A typical provision, 
again excerpted from the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, 
requires that: 
Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no 
less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to 
investors of any other Party or of any non-Party with respect to the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its 
territory.181 
Scholars have referred to such provisions as reasonable and 
“modest,” due to the limitation to “like circumstances.”182  In 
cases where the provision does apply, foreign shareholders 
would benefit from improved treatment based on the text of 
other agreements. Meanwhile, domestic shareholders remain 
subject to potentially sub-standard domestic law.  Such 
discrepancy violates the equality promoted by corporate 
governance principles. 
 
Finally, agreements include broader language to establish 
fair dealing standards.  The typical standard of treatment, here 
from the TPP draft, obligates that, “[e]ach Party shall accord to 
covered investments treatment in accordance with customary 
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and 
full protection and security.”183  Dozer explains that “the purpose 
of the clause as used in [bilateral investment treaty] practice is 
to fill gaps which may be left by the more specific standards, in 
                                                          
180  United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, May 15, 2012, 
art. 10.3.1 [hereinafter Trade Promotion Agreement]. 
181  Id. art. 10.4.1.  
182  Don Wallace & David B. Bailey, The Inevitability of National 
Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment with Increasingly Few and Narrow 
Exceptions, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 615, 620 (1998). 
183  Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 180, art. 10.5.1. 
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order to obtain the level of investor protection intended by the 
treaties.”184  This standard can be based on multiple reference 
points, including the law of the host nation at the time of 
investment, or principles of due process.185  This provision, 
though appearing on its face as encouraging equality, may 
actually require disparate treatment: if existing domestic 
practice falls below “customary international law,” foreign 
shareholders could benefit from improved treatment while 
domestic shareholders would remain subject to sub-standard 
domestic law.186  Again, foreign investors benefit from rights 
unavailable to domestic investors of the same or similarly-
situated enterprises. 
 
As a whole, the provisions already in effect underline the 
emergence of corporate governance regulation in international 
agreements.  While the EU-Japan EPA represents the first 
instance of a dedicated chapter on the subject, past agreements 




The study of corporate governance has thus far largely 
ignored an emerging source of regulation: international 
economic agreements.  State-to-state agreements implicitly and 
explicitly tackle issues related to corporate governance—where 
provisions alter the web of relationships governing the actors 
within a firm.  The signing of the EU-Japan Economic 
Partnership Agreement has brought this trend to the fore.  For 
the first time, negotiations have produced a dedicated corporate 
governance chapter.  This development requires greater study, 
as the European Union or the United States may push corporate 
governance initiatives in other agreements.  Such initiatives 
would enable domestic reformers to push for new legal 
frameworks that encourage accountability. 
 
                                                          
184  Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in 
Investment Treaties, 39 INT’L LAWYER 87, 90 (2005). 
185  See id. at 93, 97 (discussing the 2004 U.S.- Model BIT and its fair and 
equitable treatment). 
186  Sykes, supra note 103, at 511. 
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Future comparative work should consider how these 
agreements fit into the evolution of corporate law.  These 
developments complicate a view that comparative corporate law 
should focus only on domestic legal developments.  Instead, 
corporate governance via international agreements may support 
greater convergence across jurisdictions.  Such changes signal 
progress, as long as individual states can maintain the power to 
shape domestic codes to address unique local concerns.  
Ultimately, future agreements may follow the positive lead of 
the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement: effective 
signaling mechanisms, rather than fully binding commitments 
to specific rules. 
 
In recent years, new topics, such as labor and environmental 
chapters, have become essential components in international 
economic agreements.  These disciplines acknowledge the vast 
impact of economic agreements on different stakeholders within 
party nations.  A similar transformation could occur on the 
corporate governance front.  Recent accords, such as the TPP 
and the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, may be on 
the vanguard of international agreements influencing domestic 
corporate governance and the firm’s constituents. 
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